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Strategy is in trouble: noted shortcomings include a failure to anticipate the fi nancial crisis, 
exposed defi ciencies in its economic heritage, and once lauded companies succumbing 
to complacency and inertia (e.g. Nokia and Kodak). In addition, the language of strategy 
(mission, vision, objectives, etc.) has become increasingly empty, promoting convergence 
and similarity as opposed to divergence and uniqueness. According to Rumelt, the real 
problem is not that companies are getting strategy wrong but that they ‘aren’t getting it 
all’ (Hill, 2011). With a 40-year track record and McKinsey’s designation as ‘strategy’s 
strategist’, Rumelt commands attention when discussing issues of strategy. His contribu-
tions are not known for their regularity (there is a 37-year interval since his last strategy 
text) but, critically, they are known for their impact. Conceptually, Rumelt’s (1979) work 
unpacking the dynamics of strategy evaluation is still a classic. Empirically, Rumelt (1982) 
was one of the fi rst to demonstrate a relationship between corporate strategy and profi t-
ability. His 1991 paper ‘How Much Does Industry Matter?’ provided the much needed 
empirical impetus for the resource-based view of the fi rm, indicating that the character-
istics of individual fi rms were actually more predictive of profi tability than traditionally 
assumed industry characteristics (Rumelt, 1991). The implication was that being good at 
what you do mattered a lot more than what industry you were in. This theme is trans-
ferred to Good Strategy/Bad Strategy, and here it is clear that ‘good strategy’ is the exception, 
while its antithesis is the rule. So how does the distinction between good and bad strategy 
play out?
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BAD STRATEGY 
In Part 1 of the text Rumelt explores the hallmarks of ‘bad strategy’. First up is a failure to 
face the problem at hand. Here Rumelt injects a sense of realism, arguing that strategy does 
not equate to ‘a list of things you wish would happen’ (p. 43). Too often companies under-
stand strategy as constituting stretch goals which focus on ideal states of affairs instead 
of directly identifying and analysing the obstacles in their path. As Rumelt puts it, ‘you 
can’t discern the elephant studying the plan because the plan doesn’t mention it’ (p. 42). 
A second error is mistaking goals for strategy. Frequently, ambitious goals are presented 
without any in-depth consideration of the means by which they will be achieved. In 
contrast, Rumelt poses the critical question ‘What has to happen?’, highlighting that stra-
tegic objectives should address a specifi c process or accomplishment. In this way, ‘strategy 
is like a lever that magnifi es force’ (p. 46). Related, a third hallmark of bad strategy is fuzzy 
or bad strategic objectives. These occur when objectives fail to address critical issues, when 
they are multiple and confused (‘dog’s dinner objectives’), or when they are impracticable. 
It follows that a successful leader’s job is to constantly adjust the bridge between goals 
(broad) and objectives (more operational) to ensure a viable pathway. The fi nal hallmark 
of ‘bad strategy’, which arguably is common to the previous three, is the notion of ‘fl uff’; 
that is, ‘a restatement of the obvious, combined with a generous sprinkling of buzzwords 
that masquerade as expertise’ (p. 37). Here bland, ubiquitous statements are presented as 
if they were decisive insights. Making his point, Rumelt (p. 67) provides a tongue-in-cheek 
template for this task: 
The Vision: Fill in your vision of what the school/business/nation will be like in the future. Cur-
rently popular visions are to be the best or the leading or the best known.
The Strategies: Fill in some aspirations/goals but call them strategies. For example, ‘to invest 
in a portfolio of performance businesses that create value for our shareholders and growth for our 
customers’.
This is an important point, as one of the unspoken problems of strategy is a vocabu-
lary made up of high sounding words and poetic turns of phrase which arguably serve 
to conceal meaning rather than reveal it (Caulkin, 2011). This ambiguity may even be 
purposeful, serving to hide impractical objectives or uncertainty as to future direction (p. 
37). The vocabulary of strategy is also used as a fl awed, retrospective explanatory logic 
such that ascribing the success of companies such as Ford and Apple via concepts like 
‘vision’ serves as a ‘radical distortion of history’ (p. 74). But if bad strategy is so bad what 
explains its dominance? For Rumelt the answer is clear: a failure by top management to 
work hard and make tough choices, the legacy of ‘fi ll in the blank’ strategy templates, and 
a fl awed reliance on a positive mind set as a basis to succeed (see Ehrenreich, 2009). The 
‘bad strategy’ criticism may seem harsh, but recent global events and the downfall of once 
great companies render it justifi ed. But what then is the alternative put forward that consti-
tutes ‘good’ strategy? 
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ENTER GOOD STRATEGY AND SOURCES OF POWER 
Rumelt’s saviour is a strategy that has at its core the ‘discovery of critical factors in a situa-
tion, and designing a way of co-ordinating and focusing actions to deal with those factors’ 
(p. 2). In essence, ‘good strategy’ involves an honest acknowledgement of challenges and a 
means to overcome them in a cohesive manner. The driving logic is one of focus; strategy 
constitutes a ‘cohesive response to a challenge’ (Rumelt, 2009: 35). This perspective moves 
strategy beyond simplistic, dreamy visions of success to honestly acknowledge challenges 
and barriers. Rumelt captures this importance succinctly with the observation that ‘all 
analysis starts with the consideration of what may happen, including unwelcome events. 
I would not care to fl y in an airplane designed by people who focused only on an image 
of a fl ying airplane and never considered models of failure’ (p. 76). Thus strategy does 
not equate to buzzwords, slogans, plug and play solutions or fi nancial goals. Instead the 
‘kernel’ of good strategy includes diagnosis, which explores the nature of the challenge; 
a guiding policy – the overall approach chosen to overcome the obstacles identifi ed; and, 
fi nally, coherent action which equates to coordinated steps to enable accomplishment of 
policy. Strategy is thus a mixture of argument and action which focuses attention and ulti-
mately resources on some objectives at the expense of others. Based on these criteria few 
organisations are said to have a strategy, let alone a good one. The latter half of the text 
unpacks this logic by exploring a number of fundamental sources of power used in good 
strategies. These include leverage, proximate objectives, chain-link systems, design, focus, 
growth, advantage, dynamics, inertia and entropy. Rumelt argues that, having identifi ed 
the critical issues, talented leaders use these pivot points to multiply the effectiveness of 
effort. 
THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE …? 
This text is written in an extremely engaging style and user-friendly tone, balancing 
academic insight with practical understanding. Drawing upon ‘hard-won lessons of a life 
time experience of strategy work’ (p. 4) means that Rumelt offers an authoritative voice. 
This is reinforced by the wealth of in-depth examples deployed, stemming from politics to 
sport, from the ancient to the modern and from classic companies to corner stores. Notably, 
these include some of Rumelt’s own tales from the battlefi eld drawing upon personal 
conversations with Steve Jobs and Andy Grove. Some might argue that the good strategy/
bad strategy contrast is somewhat simplistic and a little forced, but this could also be read 
as an application of the logic of simplicity and focus which underpins the text. That said, 
the second section of the book, which explores sources of power, lacks focus of the kind 
Rumelt himself would prescribe. The ten chapters in this section cover a diversity of topics, 
from leverage through to system linkages and inertia. While conscious of Rumelt’s desire 
to move away from rigid frameworks and templates, a greater logic or rationale (beyond 
‘generality’ and ‘freshness’ (p. 94)) for sequencing and content would have sharpened the 
analysis and enhanced the application. 
Perhaps somewhat underdeveloped in the text, Rumelt’s argument has major implica-
tions for how strategy c(sh)ould be researched and taught. Indeed, according to Rumelt 
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a key problem in strategy is that ‘systems of deduction and computation do not produce 
new interesting ideas, no matter how hard one winds the crank’ (p. 243). Arguably much 
thinking in strategy is caught in a normal science agenda which privileges the status quo 
both with respect to existing modes of teaching and research. By contrast, the best science 
involves confronting uncertainty, including unwelcome effects and embracing challenge 
(p. 76). This mandates more dialogue and internal conversations and less dogma and 
prescription than is currently the case (Dunne and Martin, 2006). As Rumelt noted some 
time ago, ‘the kind of situations that call for strategic thinking are ill structured, charac-
terised by diffi culty and ambiguity’ (1979: 198). Perhaps the greatest tool the student of 
strategy can acquire ‘is the ability to think about your own thinking, to make judgements 
about your own judgements’ (p. 267).
More critically minded scholars may question if there is a purposefulness and political 
utility stemming from the retention of so-called ‘bad strategy’. Is it likely that challenges 
will be openly confronted and discussed, especially if they threaten certain pockets of 
power? Perhaps it is more likely that top management will verbally articulate the desir-
ability of good strategy, while privately behaving as per the ways of old (Pech, 2001). It is 
also well recognised that ambiguous concepts may serve to promote one agenda, retaining 
a current order while silencing or distancing others. This begs the question of good strategy 
for whom? In Rumelt’s narrow account top management and the corporation seem to reign 
supreme. 
Overall, in writing this text Rumelt has proved that he is one who is not frightened 
to take up the challenges of strategy. It is certainly about time somebody climbed off the 
strategy pedestal and told it more like it is. This book goes some way, shedding the strait-
jacket of prescription to offer a more problem-driven approach to strategising. The focus 
on understanding is much welcomed and is likely to have great practitioner import. In 
advancing ‘good strategy’ some may claim there is really not much that is novel or new here 
– but why should there be? Perhaps our understanding of strategy has simply lost focus. In 
reconceptualising strategy as honestly acknowledging key problems and deciding priori-
ties, before developing coherent solutions, Rumelt has done much to put us back on track. 
Moreover, in so doing Rumelt has deftly combined the many faces of strategy –  Porterian 
focus, Grove/Gladwell’s infl ection/tipping points, Druckerian hard graft – wrapped in 
a mode of questioning and learning that Mintzberg would be sympathetic towards (see 
Rumelt, 1996). Early in the text Rumelt notes that ‘a hallmark of true expertise and insight 
is making a complex subject understandable’ (p. 40). With Good Strategy/Bad Strategy there 
is little doubt he has achieved this task. It is now for others to understand the difference 
and why it matters. 
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